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INTRODUCTION

If one were to take a walk down the street and ask ten individuals if they
had ever been a victim of a large-scale data breach, approximately six out of that
ten would indicate that they had been a victim.' Americans are extremely wary
of large-scale key institutions' ability, such as the government and social media

I
Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Americans andCybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET
& TECH. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.
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companies, to protect the information that consumers choose to provide or are
forced to provide to these organizations. 2 This shared concern is not without
basis. Recently, there has been a significant increase in the frequency of data
breaches involving millions of personal records, each having significant impact
on the victims.3
Consider the story of Katie Van Fleet-a Seattle, Washington, resident
who became a victim of the recent Equifax breach.' Ms. Fleet's self-described
nightmare began in September of 2017 when she received a thank-you note for
opening a new line of credit.' She had no knowledge of how this account was
opened.6 From then on, the gracious thank-you notes continued to roll in from
retail stores and other credit agencies. 7 In total, over a dozen unauthorized
accounts were opened in Ms. Fleet's name.' Alarmed by the flurry activity, Ms.
Fleet froze her credit reports and filed a police report.' After taking those initial
steps, Ms. Fleet retained an attorney and filed a class action suit against Equifax
for the recent data breach."o Ms. Fleet's story, while extreme, does not exist in a
vacuum.
For example, David Anderson had his personal information stolen four
times over the span of four years." Specifically, Mr. Anderson's information was
stolen during the Target Data Breach, a breach at the University of Maryland, a
breach at the Office of Personnel Management, and the Equifax data breach."
So far, Mr. Anderson has been lucky enough to avoid suffering any direct
financial losses due to the various breaches-others were not so lucky." One

See id. Approximately half of Americans do not trust these organizations to adequately
protect their information. Id.
3
Tiffany Hsu, DataBreach Victims Talk ofInitialTerror, Then Vigilance, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept.
9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/09/business/equifax-data-breach-identity-theftvictims.html (collecting reader responses when readers were asked how their lives were impacted
by data breaches over the recent span of time).
4
Dominique Mosbergen, Seattle Woman Says Her Identity Has Been Stolen 15 Times Since
2017,
10:18
AM),
HUFFPoST
(Oct.
30,
Equifax
Data
Breach,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/katie-van-fleet-equifax-stolenidentity us 59f7 ld08e4bO7fdc5fbf782d.
5
Id.
6
See id.
2

8

Id
Id.

9

Id

10

Id.

"1

Hsu, supra note 3.

12

Id

13

Id.

7
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individual's credit was harmed to the extent that he was unable to secure a
refinanced mortgage, a significant financial roadblock.14
Additionally, Janis Barbour's social security number was stolen and
utilized to file a fraudulent tax return in Ohio even though she lives in
California." Barbour was unaware of this fraudulent activity until the Internal
Revenue Service notified her of the inconsistencies in her tax returns."' What
followed was a nine-month journey during which she had to contact over five
different governmental and non-governmental organizations to correct the
error.17
To combat these various issues, local businesses have taken drastic steps,
such as rejecting electronic payments, not utilizing an internet-connected
computer, and calling credit card companies to process electronic transactions,
to avoid any potential liability.' 8
Data breaches cause a significant impact on both individual and
corporate victims. The current regulation system has not evolved in the proper
way to deal with the exponential increase in data breaches. Therefore, this Note
will explore the current identity authentication process, the underlying causes of
data breaches, and the current regulation scheme. Then, this Note will propose a
solution to bring the regulation landscape up-to-date with the current cyber
security landscape. First, Section II.A. outlines the underlying causes that have
led to a significant increase in data breaches. Second, Section II.B. examines the
anatomy of a typical data breach-if there is such a thing as a typical data breach.
Finally, Section II.C. provides an overview of the applicable statutory
regulations and private contractual obligations that attempt to stem the tide of
data breaches.
Part III proposes three regulatory reforms designed to address the most
significant underlying causes of data breaches. Section HI.A. calls for a refined,
modernized, and secure replacement for the social security number. Section
III.B. proposes an increased standard for privacy policies to allow consumers to
make informed decisions about what personal information is shared. Section
III.C. calls for Congress to act, and explicitly permit the Federal Trade
Commission to regulate the payment card industry through the adoption of the
current Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards.

14

Id.

Is

Id.

16

Id.

Id.
Jim Therrien, Lawmakers Hear Residents on Data Breaches, MIANCHESTER J. (Nov. 16,
2017, 9:12 AM), http://www.manchesterjournal.com/stories/lawmakers-hear-residents-on-databreaches,524760.
17
18
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II. BACKGROUND

Section II.A. will first examine current types of personal information
being targeted, why companies are collecting the information, and the problems
surrounding the current authentication scheme. Section II.B. then explores the
underlying nature of a data breach and the variety of causes. Finally, Section
II.C. identifies the current regulation and enforcement scheme available before
the breach and the avenues of redress available to victims who have had their
information stolen.
A.

Problems Surroundingthe CurrentIdentity Authentication Scheme in
the UnitedStates

One well-known principle in the computer science field is Moore's
Law." According to Gordon Moore, the observer of Moore's law,20 chip
technology was advancing at such a pace that every other year twice as many
transistors could fit on a single chip.2 1 Since 1975, Moore's observation has
largely held true and, as a result, technology plays a rapidly increasing role in
our society.22 That increasing role has created a ripe opportunity for business to
collect and utilize a massive amount of personal data from customers and even
from individuals who are not their customers.2 3
Every day, an unimaginable amount of data is generated. According to
recent reports, two and a half quintillion bytes24 of data are generated daily.25 "To
19
Peter Bright, Moore's Law Really Is Dead This Time, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:22
PM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/moores-law-really-is-dead-thistime/; Tom Simonite, Moore's Law Is Dead. Now What?, MIT TECH. REv. (May 13, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601441/moores-law-is-dead-now-what/.
20
Simonite, supra note 19.
21
Id.
22
23
24

25

Id.
Id
2,500,000,000,000,000,000 bytes.
IBM MARKETING CLOUD, 10 KEY MARKETING

2017 AND IDEAS FOR EXCEEDING
3
(2017),
https://public.dhe.ibm.concommon/ssilecm/wr/en/wrl12345usen/watson-customer-engagementwatson-marketing-wr-other-papers-and-reports-wrll2345usen-20170719.pdf A byte is "a unit of
computer information or data-storage capacity that consists of a group of eight bits and that is used
especially to represent
an
alphanumeric
character."
Byte, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarylbyte (last visited Sept. 14, 2018). Originally, byte
was a unit for measuring character data, but, over time, a byte became the fundamental
measurement for all data storage. Byte, TECHTERMs, https://techterms.com/definition/byte (last
updated Nov. 30, 2011). Because a byte is an extremely small unit of data measurement, various
prefixes are attached-for example, "mega-"and "tera-"--to represent an exponential increase in
the number of bytes the storage device is capable of storing. See id.
CUSTOMER

TRENDS FOR

EXPECTATIONS
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put that into perspective, 90 percent of the data in the world today has been
created in the last two years alone ... ."26 Additionally, the amount of data
generated daily is equivalent to approximately 50 million high-capacity Blu-ray
discs.27 The daily data produced is exponentially increasing, and some estimate
that by the year 2020, 40 zettabytes 28 of data will be created on a daily basis.2 9
Most often, when individuals hear of a data breach, they assume, as often
is the case, that their credit card information has been stolen."o One of the more
well-known data breaches was when a large amount of credit card information
was stolen from Target Corporation's network." In that attack, the information
of approximately 110 million customers-including debit and credit card
numbers-was stolen from the retailer's system.12 Since then, there has been an
increasing number of large scale breaches, and the impact of the breaches has
only grown more concerning.
Within the last fifteen years, there has been a significant change in how
non-cash payments are used and handled. 34 The once-reigning king of non-cash
payments, handwritten checks, has now been dethroned by various electronic
payment methods." From its peak in 1995, the use of checks has been steadily
declining each year." Currently, the leading non-cash payment method is debit
card payments, with a total of 69.5 billion payments in 2015 and a value of $2.56
trillion.3 ' Following debit card payments, credit card payments were utilized in

IBM MARKETING CLOUD, supra note 25, at 3.
Id.
28
40,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes.
29
Daniel Price, Infographic:How Much Data Is ProducedEvery Day?, CLOuDTWEAKS (Mar.
17, 2015), https://cloudtweaks.com/2015/03/how-much-data-is-produced-every-day/.
30
Data Breaches 101: How They Happen, What Gets Stolen, and Where it all Goes, TREND
MICRO (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/databreach-101.
31
See In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1154 (D. Minn. 2014).
32
Id. at 1157.
26
27

3

2015

Data

Breaches,

IDENTITY

THEFT

RESOURCE

CTR.

(Jan.

25,

2016),

https://www.idtheficenter.org/2015-data-breaches/; see also ITRC Breach Statistics 2005 - 2016,
IDENTITY
THEFT
RESOURCE
CTR.
(2017),
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/Overview2005to20l6Finalv2.pdf (compiling data
breach statistics from 2005 through 2016 and categorizing based on industry affected and category
of breach).
34

FED.

RESERVE Sys.,

THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS

STUDY

2016

1

(2016),

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-study-20161222.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 2.
3
Id. at 3.
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33.8 billion transactions in 2015 with a total value of $3.16 trillion.38 Next,
Automatic Clearing House payments were utilized in 23.5 billion transactions in
2015, with a relatively large value of $145.30 trillion. Overall, the frequency of
non-cash payments has increased at an annual rate of 5.3% between 2012 and
2015 and will likely continue to increase at a similar rate." Additionally, noncash payments are going through a technological evolution to enable a more
secure transaction. 4 0 However, the adoption of this technology has been gradual,
and the majority of non-cash payments are still a significantly attractive target
for credit and debit card fraud.4 1
While non-cash payment information is often the target of attacks, the
individuals responsible for breaches are also stealing other personally
identifiable information because of the ease of using the stolen information. 4 2
According to the United States Office of Management and Budget, personally
identifiable information ("PH") is any information that can be used, alone or in
conjunction with other information, to uncover an individual's identity. 43
Therefore, P11 can include a broad range of identifiers such as date of birth, ZIP
code, driver's license number, phone number, and much more."
Furthermore, approximately 87% of the United States' population can
be identified with a mere three pieces of information-gender, ZIP code, and
date of birth.4 5 Companies can be driven to collect this type of information for a
variety of reasons. 46 For example, a consumer may provide information to sign
38

Id.

Id. at 2.
This has included the adoption of debit card and credit card with chip and signature
technology or chip and pin technology. See id. at 7. Without the proper hardware updates,
merchants are unable to utilize this more-secure method, so they default to the less-secure magnetic
strip payment method. See id.
41
Id
42
See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157 (D. Minn.
2014).
43
Rules and Policies- ProtectingPI - PrivacyAct, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN. (Oct. 31, 2014),
https://www.gsa.gov/reference/gsa-privacy-program/rules-and-policies-protecting-pii-privacyact. "The term 'PII,' as defined in OMB Memorandum M-07-1616 refers to information that can
be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other
personal or identifying information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual." Id.; see also
John Stringer, ProtectingPersonallyIdentifiableInformation: What DataIs at Risk and What You
Can
Do
About
It,
SOPHos
2
(2011),
https://www.sophos.com/enus/medialibrary/pdfs/other/sophosprotectingpii.pdf.
4
Stringer, supra note 43, at 2.
45
See generally Philippe Golle, Revisiting the Uniqueness ofSimple Demographicsin the US
Population, PALO ALTo REs. CTR. (2006), https://crypto.stanford.edu/-pgolle/papers/census.pdf
(evaluating the study based on the 1990 census that identified this provision and ultimately
concluding that only 63% percent of the population could be identified through this).
46
Stringer, supranote 43, at 1.
3

4o
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up for a service, but most often a company will request unnecessary additional
information to advance their marketing programs.47
Perhaps the most heavily-guarded-holy grail like-of all personal
information in existence today is the social security number. Social security
identification numbers are so highly-regarded because the numbers are unique
and often remain with a person for life.4 8 Furthermore, social security numbers
are provided to all United States citizens, and sometimes to noncitizens, by the
Social Security Administration.4 9 Therefore, the social security number is
uniquely situated to serve as an identifier.o
Originally created in 1936, the social security card was only intended to
serve as an identifier for social security programs.5 1 However, over time,
organizations recognized that the social security number could easily be used for
identification.5 2 Perhaps the most significant shift for the social security number
occurred in 1961 when the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") began using the
social security number as a method for tax payer identification.5 3 Since then, all
transactions involving IRS reporting required the attachment of an individual's
social security number.54 Additionally, credit card applications often require a
social security number for the financial institution to identify the applicant. In
comparison, other countries seem to rely less on credit than United States
consumers and do not place the same amount of emphasis on a social securitytype number like United States-based companies do.56

Id.
See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft
Problem, 80 TEX. L. REv. 89, 95-100 (2001) (discussing how the social security card is utilized to
verify the identity of individuals in conjunction with the use of other known information in
common transactions such as retail credit accounts).
47
48

49

See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AND CARD, PUBLICATION No. 05-

10002 (2017).
50
LoPucki, supra note 48, at 95-100.
51
University of San Diego Center for Public Interest Law, How to Keep Your Personal
Information Personal: Tips from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 14 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1, 5
(1994).
52
Id.
Id.
Id.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., CREDIT CARD APPLICATION FORMS EXPLAINED, UKCREDITCARDS.COM,
(last
http://uk.creditcards.com/assets/documents/credit-card-application-forms-explained.pdf
visited Oct. 5, 2018); Identification, NZ TRANSPORT AGENCY, https://www.nzta.govt.nz/driverlicences/getting-a-licence/identification/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
53

54
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For example, Canada has recognized the weaknesses of having a national
identification number similar to the social security number.1 7 In 2004, a privacy
law went into effect that explicitly prohibited Canadian companies and
organizations from requiring the production of a citizen's Social Insurance
Number ("SIN"), which is the Canadian equivalent of a social security number."
This adoption was a significant departure from the prior scheme where
businesses were permitted to collect the SIN in order to identify the individual
and to make credit decisions." To enact this significant shift, the Canadian
government focused on working with private businesses to ensure that there
would not be a negative impact on their business.' Through this cooperative
effort, the privacy act did not completely bar organizations from collecting
information, but it required proper notice of any personal data usage and free
consent for the collection of a SIN." However, after the privacy act went into
effect, some businesses experienced growing pains.62 For example, one business
was sanctioned by an administrative agency for not properly formatting the
company's credit application form and for not stating that providing a SIN was
optional." Canada's enactment of the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act provides an example of how a country has moved
from the singular key to the kingdom-a national identification number with a
wide variety of uses-to a limited national identification number.

5
See generally David T.S. Fraser, New Rules for Using Social InsuranceNumbers: Privacy
Legislation
Places
Limits
on
SIN,
McINNEs
COOPER
(2003),
http://www.privacylawyer.ca/privacy/piepda-and-social-insurance_nunbers.pdf (discussing the
adoption and application of the new privacy law).
ss
"4.3.3 An organization shall not, as a condition of the supply of a product or service, require
an individual to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of information beyond that required to
fulfil the explicitly specified, and legitimate purposes." Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.).
59
Fraser, supra note 57, at 1.
6
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Attacks on America-PrivacyImplications of HeightenedSecurity
Measures in the United States, Europe, and Canada,67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 83, 109 (2002).
61
Id. at 1ll.
62
See Fraser,supra note 57, at 2.
63
As for the matter of providing SINs, the Commissioner referred to another recent finding
with respect to a different bank's credit card application form. In that case, the focus was on the
fact that this form did not clearly indicate that providing the SIN for identification purposes was
optional. It was determined that the bank had not made a reasonable effort to ensure that the
customer was adequately informed of this and, as a result, was not obtaining valid, meaningful
consent. Fraser, supra note 57, at 1.
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B. Anatomy of a Data Breach
To begin, no data breach between organizations, or even a repeated
breach within the same organization, is similar for a number of reasons. For
example, a breach could impact a limited system within the network, resulting in
minimal impact, or, conversely, the breach could spread undetected through the
entire network.' This Section will address the underlying cause of data breaches
and will discuss some well-known incidents to highlight the breach's effect and
how an organization should respond.
As a general matter, data breaches can be categorized into three groups
based on the nature of the intrusion: well-meaning insiders, targeted attacks, and
malicious insiders." Each individual subgroup has different characteristics that
give rise to the data breach and the causes are often intermingled between the
different categories.6 6
The first group of data breaches, those involving well-meaning insiders,
occur when an employee opens the door for nefarious actors to infiltrate a
system.67 One common example of this is a phishing attack that may be directed
at a specific individual." In order to accomplish this infiltration, the attacker
typically creates a legitimate looking e-mail or website and directs the e-mail
towards a business's employees.69 While not solely designed to infiltrate the
system, the phishing attack is designed to passively collect an employee's
credentials that will later be used by the attacker.70 Another version of a wellmeaning insider attack occurs when an employee does not follow the
organization's established data security policy.7 1 For example, if an employee
has created a file that contains highly sensitive information but then fails to take
the proper steps to secure the data, that employee has created a massive risk.72
Additionally, employees are a weak link because humans are vulnerable to social

6

See

Morgan

O'Mara,

Different

Types

of Data Breaches,

https://www.shrednations.com/2015/08/different-types-of-data-breaches/
2018).
65

SHRED

NATIONS,

(last updated Jan. 29,

SYMANTEC CORP., ANATOMY OF A DATA BREACH: WHY BREACHES HAPPEN AND WHAT TO

DO ABouT rr 2-6 (2009), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/banatomyof a_databreach_WP_20049424-1.en-us.pdf.

6

Id.

67

Id. at 2-3.

6s

Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, 30

HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 290 (2006).
69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

SYMANTEC CORP., supra note 65, at 6-7.
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engineering. 73 Through social engineering, an employee may unknowingly and
willingly give an outside individual access to the system by sharing a password
or providing the attacker with enough information to gain access.74
The second group, targeted attacks, consists of attacks where companies
must engage in active prevention to ensure that a weakness is not capitalized on
by an attacker.7 ' This type of attack is dissimilar to the well-meaning insider
attack because the attackers are taking active steps to exploit program
vulnerabilities. 6 One potential vulnerability that attackers might exploit is a
security hole located in older software that has not been updated." In fact, this is
a frequent avenue of attack because corporate entities often utilize legacy
software and sometimes do not update the underlying operating system with new
security updates." In addition, attackers may utilize a targeted attack in hopes of
obtaining information that will grant the attackers access to a larger system. 7 For
example, an attack that led to a larger breach occurred when the attackers
infiltrated a large retail store's network due to the breach of a contractor's
network." After obtaining access to the contractor's network, the attackers
discovered credentials that granted access to the retail store's network."
Thereafter, the attackers were able to freely move about the store's network to
install register-based malware because there was no system in place to separate
the different network functions.82 Those compounded failures resulted in the loss
of approximately 110 million customer records, including 40 million card
numbers.8 3

7
See generally Sarah Granger, Social EngineeringFundamentals, PartI: Hacker Tactics,
SYmANTEC CORP. (Dec.
18, 2001), https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/socialengineering-fundamentals-part-i-hacker-tactics (discussing the various social engineering methods
that attackers utilize to infiltrate the business networks).
74
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 68, at 290-91.
7s

SYMANTEC CORP., supra note 65, at 3-4.

76

Id.

Id.
7
See Dan Woods, Why You Must Build Cybersecurity Into Your Applications, FORBES (Apr.
20, 2017, 6:49 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danwoods/2017/04/20/why-you-must-buildcybersecurity-into-your-applications.
7
Id.
so
Brian Krebs, TargetHackers Broke in Via HVAC Company, KREBsONSECURTY (Feb. 5,
2014),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company/
[hereinafter Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company].
81
Id.
82
Brian Krebs, Inside Target Corp., Days After 2013 Breach, KREBSONSEcuRTTY (Sept. 21,
2015),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/09/inside-target-corp-days-after-2013-breach/
[hereinafter Inside Target Corp.].
83
See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1307 (D.
Minn. 2014); Inside Target Corp., supra note 82.
"
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The final, largest category of data breaches, is the malicious insider. A
malicious insider is an employee who has been granted appropriate access levels
but uses that access for their own personal gain or for a competitor's gain.84
Employees at risk for this type of behavior include recently-terminated
employees, career building employees, employees engaged in industrial
espionage, and employees who are actively involved in white collar crime."
Each category of employees poses a different challenge to address in order to
prevent data breaches, and there is no clear answer on how to prevent an
employee from sabotaging their employer." However, an employer can take
active steps, such as conducting background checks, monitoring employee
behavior, limiting access to sensitive information, and educating employees to
limit the risk of a malicious insider breach."
One particular data breach that highlights the consequences of an
organization failing to take proper steps to prevent an intrusion and subsequent
breach is the 2014 Home Depot data breach." As a result of the data breach,
Home Depot was sued by multiple parties, including various financial
institutions that suffered significant losses because they were forced to issue new
credit cards and reimburse consumers for any financial loss.89 In addressing
Home Depot's motion to dismiss, the court discussed the variety of factors that
contributed to the data breach.' Home Depot's troubles began in 2008 when
multiple employees informed their supervisors that "the computer systems were
'easy prey for hackers' and that they could be breached by anyone with 'basic
internet skills."" Furthermore, in 2009, employees once again warned that
Home Depot was not using effective security measures because the company
failed to encrypt sensitive customer data.9 2 Home Depot, instead of fixing the
issue, chose to terminate the employee who specifically warned of a system
vulnerability; addressing the vulnerability likely would have limited the impact
of the data breach that did occur. 93 In 2012, Home Depot hired a computer

8
85
86

SYMANTEc CoRP., supra note 65, 5-6.
Id.
Id.

8
Marcell Gogan, Insider Threats as the Main Security Threat in 2017, TRIPWIRE (Apr. 11,
2017), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/insider-threats-mainsecurity-threat-2017/.
88
See In re The Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 1: 14-MD-2583-TWT,
2016 WL 2897520 at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2016) (granting in part and denying in part The Home
Depot Inc.'s motion to dismiss).

89

Id.

90

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

91
92

93
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engineer to oversee the security of its stores, but the engineer was sentenced to
prison in 2014 for sabotaging the computer systems at a previous place of
employment.94 Overall, Home Depot fostered a culture where data security fell
behind all other priorities and the business suffered as a result." Specifically,
management instructed employees not to fix security deficiencies and warned
the employees that their efforts were futile because the company would not spend
any money to make the necessary improvements."
The perfect storm of failures came to a head in April of 2014 when
hackers were able to gain access to Home Depot's system after stealing a
contractor's credentials." Once the hackers were in the system, they were able
to successfully install malware on the store's self-checkout terminals without
raising any alarms." The hackers then collected customers' debit and credit card
information from the terminals for approximately five months before Home
Depot was notified of the breach in the system." By the time Home Depot was
aware of the breach, approximately 50 million pieces of consumer information
were stolen and placed for sale on the black market." Home Depot eventually
settled all suits related to the 2014 data breach for approximately $179 million
10
between the consumer classes and the financial institutions.o

94
Julie Creswell & Nicole Perlroth, Ex-Employees Say Home Depot Left Data Vulnerable,
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/ex-employees-sayhome-depot-left-data-vulnerable.html.
95
In re The Home Depot, Inc., 2016 WL 2897520, at *1.
96

Id.

9
98

Id. at *2.
Id.

9

Id.

Home Depot was notified by the United States Secret Service on Sept. 2, 2014, that its
systems had been breached. Id. at *2. The Secret Service is often the first investigative agency to
notify corporations of large scale data breaches because the agency is responsible for the
investigation of large scale financial crimes. See The Investigative Mission, U.S. SECRET SERV.,
https://www.secretservice.gov/investigation/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). Additionally, card
issuers and banks are often the first to notice and link the large-scale fraud to a specific company
as the stolen information is sold and used for fraudulent transactions. See Kimberly Palmer, How
Credit Card Companies Spot FraudBefore You Do, U.S. NEws (July 10, 2013, 10:00 AM),
https://creditcards.usnews.com/how-credit-card-companies-spot-fraud-before-you-do (discussing
the various monitoring tools that credit card companies utilize to detect if a card has been
compromised).
101
Jeff John Roberts, Home Depot to Pay Banks $25 Million in Data Breach Settlement,
FORTUNE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/home-depot-data-breach-banks/; see also
Jonathan Stempel, Home Depot Settles ConsumerLawsuit over Big 2014 DataBreach, REUTERS
(Mar.
8,
2016,
11:33 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-home-depot-breachsettlement/home-depot-settles-consumer-lawsuit-over-big-2014-data-breach-idUSKCNOWA24Z.
100
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Another infamous data breach occurred in the fall of 2013 during Target
Corporation's busiest time of the year.102 Similar to Home Depot, Target's
system was breached when the attacker infiltrated an outside vendor who had
remote access to Target's computer system.'0 3 Subsequently, the attacker
obtained access to Target's payment processing system and installed a program
designed to steal payment card information. 10 Prior to the breach being
discovered, the attackers were able to steal approximately 110 million customer
10 During Target's
records, including 40 million debit and credit card numbers.o
post-breach review, the company identified several areas, such as weak
passwords and outdated security patches, that impacted the scale of the breach.' 0
In the aftermath of the breach, Target was sued by both consumers and banks
who suffered losses due to the data breach.o' As a result of the various lawsuits,
Target has paid out approximately $116 million through various settlements with
card issuers, states, and individual consumers. 08
Finally, private companies are not the only organizations that can fall
victim to a data breach because of an organizational failure. In fact, governmental
entities may be more susceptible to an organizational failure that results in a data
breach. One recent example is the 2016 breach where attackers obtained access
to the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") system known as
Edgar.o' Edgar is an automated system that has been the sole method for
companies filing required forms with the SEC since 1996.110 Because companies
are required to file a wide variety of forms that often contain sensitive
information about companies' inner workings, Edgar is an appealing target to

102

In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1307 (D. Minn.

2014).
103

TElu RADICHEL, SANS INST. INFOSEC READING RooM, CASE STUDY: CRITICAL CONTROLS

THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED TARGET BREACH 2 (2014),

https://www.sans.org/reading-

room/whitepapers/casestudies/case-study-critical-controls-prevented-target-breach-35412.
104
Id.
105
In re Target Corp., 64 F. Supp. 3d at 1307; Inside Target Corp., supra note 82.
106
Inside Target Corp., supra note 82.
107
In re Target Corp., 64 F. Supp. 3d at 1307.
108
See Shan Li, Target Reaches Deal with Visa over 2013 Data Breach, L.A. TIMEs (Aug. 18,
2015, 12:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-target-breach-settlement-20150818story.html; Samantha Masunaga, Target Will Pay $18.5 Million in Settlement with States over 2013
Data Breach, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2017,3:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-targetcredit-settlement-20170523-story.html.
109
Renae Merle, SEC Ignored Years of Warnings About CybersecurityBefore MassiveBreach,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sec-ignoredyears-of-wamings-about-cybersecurity-before-massive-breach/2017/10/24/7e7507d0-adf7-1 1 e7be94-fabb0fle9ffbstory.html.
110
Important
Information
About
EDGAR,
U.S.
SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last modified Feb. 16, 2010).
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attackers who wish to gain insight to a company's future financial events."'
Knowing this, the SEC continually ignored warnings from the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO").'1 2 By ignoring the GAO's recommendations,
the SEC did not properly encrypt the documents stored on Edgar and, when the
hackers obtained access, they were able to read the stored documents without
restriction."'3 In response, the SEC said it was continuing to investigate a report
from the GAO indicating that, at the end of the 2016 fiscal year, the SEC still
had not addressed twenty-six recommendations to improve the SEC's
information security programs."'
C.

CurrentRegulatory System

This Section will provide an overview of the main data security
regulatory sources. First, this Section will discuss the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standards, a set of contractually based standards businesses that
accept credit card payments must adhere to. Next, this Section provides an
overview of State consumer protection law that typically requires consumer
notification and free credit monitoring in the event of a data breach. Finally, this
Section discusses the Federal Trade Commission and its authority to protect
consumer's information prior to and in the event of a breach.
1. Self-Regulation: The Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards Framework
In today's world, when we think of data breaches we often think of our
credit card information being stolen from a retailer-that is with good reason
because retailers have been the victims of some of the most significant data
breaches. 5 However, most people would be surprised to know that the credit
card industry, with respect to transaction security, is largely self-regulated."'
There are many reasons that the industry has remained self-regulated, but a
potentially straight forward answer is the complexity of the system."' When
addressing a data breach, the Southern District of Texas described the credit and
debit card payment system as follows:
"

Merle, supranote 109.
Id.; see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, GAO-17-469, SEC IMPROVED CONTROL OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS BUT NEEDS TO TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS 4-6 (2017) [hereinafter SEC
IMPROVED CONTROL], https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686192.pdf.
113
Merle, supranote 109.
114
SEC IMPROVED CONTROL, supranote 112.
115
See supraPart II.B.
116
About
Us,
PCI
SECURITY
STANDARDS
COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about us/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
117
See id.
112
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Every day, merchants swipe millions of customers' payment
cards. In the seconds that pass between the swipe and approval
(or disapproval), the transaction information goes from the point
of sale, to an acquirer bank, across the credit-card network, to
the issuer bank, and back. Acquirer banks contract with
merchants to process their transactions, while issuer banks
provide credit to consumers and issue payment cards. The
acquirer bank receives the transaction information from the
merchant and forwards it over the network to the issuer bank for
approval. If the issuer bank approves the transaction, that bank
sends money to cover the transaction to the acquirer bank. The
acquirer bank then forwards payment to the merchant.118
To help ensure the security of this complicated system, the various card
issuers"' banded together and formed the Payment Card Industry ("PCI")
Security Standards Council. 20 This organization is responsible for establishing
and for updating, as needed, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards
("PCI-DSS").121 The PCI-DSS has its own strengths and weaknesses that may
affect how secure the credit and debit card processing system is.1 2 2
In order to comply with the PCI-DSS, businesses that accept electronic
payments must pass a scheduled and announced audit once per year in addition
to self-certification steps throughout the year.1 23 Furthermore, if a business
conducts a significant number of electronic payments, the business must hire an
outside consultant to conduct an independent inspection of the business's point
of sale system.1 24 However, if a business only conducts a small number of
transactions a year, then the business can conduct a self-assessment to evaluate
its compliance with the PCI-DSS.1 25 In operation, the PCI-DSS has twelve

In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1307 (D. Minn.
2014) (citing In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp.
2d 566, 574 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (footnote omitted), rev'd in part sub nom; see also Lone Star Nat'1
Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013)).
119
The founding members of the PCI Security Standards Council are American Express,
Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard, and Visa Inc. About Us, supra note
116.
120
Id.
121
Rebecca Weinstein, Note, Cybersecurity: Getting Beyond the Technical Compliance Gaps,
19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'Y 913, 927 (2016).
122
Id.
11s

123
124

125
THE

Id.
Id. at 928.
PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DSS
PAYMENT

CARD

INDUSTRY

DATA

QUICK REFERENCE

SECURITY

STANDARD

GUIDE: UNDERSTANDING

VERSION

3.2,

10

(2016),

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCIDSSQRGv3-2.pdf.
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individual requirements that are designed to help payment card processors
achieve six main goals. 126 Within each individual requirement, the standards
suggest specific action items a company can and should take to secure the
company's network.1 27 While not exhaustive, the standards are designed to
ensure a basic level of security for the organization. 128 However, companies have
often treated the PCI-DSS assessments as a once-a-year checklist to ensure
compliance and, ultimately, the company's system may be neglected during the
rest of the year.1 29
2. Limited Protection: Consumer Protection Statutes
Currently, there are forty-seven states that require companies and
organizations that collect personal information to notify individuals if a breach
compromised the security of personally identifiable information.' 30 Furthermore,
twenty-three states-including California, Maryland, and New York-require
companies to notify the state's Attorney General when there has been a breach
that compromised personally identifiable information."' The specific criteria
requiring notification varies from state to state but ranges from zero to one
thousand individuals' personal information being breached. 32
126

Id. at 9. The twelve requirements include:
1. Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data.
2. Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other
security parameters.
3. Protect stored cardholder data.
4. Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks.
5. Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus
software or programs.
6. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications.
7. Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know.
8. Identify and authenticate access to system components.
9. Restrict physical access to cardholder data.
10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data.
11. Regularly test security systems and processes.
12. Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel.

Id.
Id. at 11-24.
128
Id. at 4.
129
Weinstein, supra note 121, at 929.
130
J. Jasen Eige & Katherine Schroth, State Attorneys General Play Growing Data Privacy
Role, LAw360 (Jan. 10, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/879583/state-attomeysgeneral-play-growing-data-privacy-role.
131
Id.
132
Id
127

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss2/10

16

Holden: Better Late Than Never: Bringing the Data Security Regulatory Env

2018]

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

711

'

In West Virginia, two separate statutes contained in the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protections Act relate to data breaches and consumer
rights-the Breach of Security of Consumer Information and the Theft of
Consumer Identity Protections.' 3 3 Both statutes encompass different areas and
provide different protections.
The Breach of Security of Consumer Information statute requires
organizations to provide notice to West Virginia consumers when their
unencrypted personal information has been compromised.1 34 Unlike some other
states, organizations that have suffered a data breach are required to provide
notice to West Virginia consumers even if a single West Virginia consumer's
unencrypted information was exposed through the breach."' Furthermore, the
notice must be provided without unreasonable delay."' The Breach of Security
of Consumer Information statute also requires that organizations inform
individual consumers as to the categories of information that were accessed by
the unauthorized individuals, methods for the consumer to learn what types of
information the organization maintained, and contact information for the three
credit bureaus with instructions on how to place a freeze on the consumer's credit
reports. 37 If a covered organization fails to comply with the notice requirements,
the West Virginia Attorney General may bring an action with a potential penalty
of up to $150,000 if the organization engaged in a "course of repeated and willful
violations.""' Recently, the West Virginia Attorney General has had minor
involvement responding to data breaches.' 9 The Attorney General joined a
lawsuit with forty-seven other states to seek damages from the Target Data
Breach.14 0 The parties eventually entered into a settlement with Target that
required the company to develop an information security program and to
maintain an appropriate level of encryption for consumer data.' 4
West Virginia's data breach notification law differs from the law in some
other states in one major way-West Virginia consumers have no private right
133
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-101-105 (West 2018); W. VA. CODE ANN.
101-105 (West 2018).
134
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-102(a) (West 2018).

§ 46A-6L-

Id.
Id. Notice may be delayed if law enforcement requests the company delay providing notice
because the notice may obstruct an ongoing investigation or create a risk to national security. See
Id. § 46A-2A-102(e).
'n
Id.§ 46A-2A-102(d).
138
Id. § 46A-2A-104(b).
13
Chris Dickerson, West Virginia to Get $200K in Target Data Breach Settlement, W. VA.
REc. (May 24, 2017), https://wvrecord.com/stories/511119327-west-virginia-to-get-200k-intarget-data-breach-settlement.
140
Id.
135

136

141

Id.
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of action. 142 Therefore, the West Virginia consumer must rely on the Attorney
General to protect their rights under the notification law.1 43 However, the
Attorney General's office wears a multitude of different hats.'" Therefore, if the
data breach and subsequent failure to provide notification is not significant, the
Attorney General may not pursue the full extent of all remedies. Additionally,
the money recovered from a settlement reached may not directly benefit the
consumers that suffered the original harm from the data breach.1 45
The second West Virginia statute designed to protect West Virginia
consumers from the effects of data breaches is the article of the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act entitled "Theft of Consumer Identity
Protections."'4 6 While not directly related to the detection, prevention, or
notification of data breaches, this statute is important in minimizing the ill effects
of any data breach that affects consumers.' 7 Under this statute, credit reporting
agencies are required to allow consumers to prevent their credit report from being
distributed to a third party.14 8 By mandating that companies offer this service, the
state empowers consumers to prevent and stop any potential damage that could
occur as a result of a data breach. 149 Freezing a consumer's credit report
effectively stops the majority of financial loss related to identity theft because it
is exceedingly difficult for anyone other than the consumer to open an account
during the freeze.so If a credit reporting agency were to negligently violate the
credit freeze, a consumer would be entitled to file suit seeking to recover actual
damages along with reasonable attorney's fees."'

Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-104(b) (West 2018) (stating that "the Attorney
General shall have exclusive authority to bring action"), with D.C. CODE § 28-3853(a) (2018)
(stating that any "resident injured . . . may institute a civil action") and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
359-C:21 (West 2018) (stating that "[a]ny person injured .. . may bring an action for damages and
for such equitable relief').
143
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-104(b) (West 2018).
14
See Mission of the Attorney General, W. VA. ATr'Y GEN.'s OFF.,
https://ago.wv.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
14
See Kyla Asbury, House Bill to Limit AG's Use of Settlement Funds Passes 90-7, W. VA.
REc. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://wvrecord.com/stories/511344627-house-bill-to-limit-ag-s-use-ofsettlement-funds-passes-90-7 (discussing recent efforts to reform the Attorney General's
settlement fund and describing how the Attorney General has already returned $39 million to the
state legislature from litigation settlements).
146
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6L-101-105 (West 2018).
147
See
Credit
Freeze
FAQs,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0497-credit-freeze-faqs (last updated Sept. 2018).
148
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6L-102 (West 2018).
149
See id.
ISO Credit Freeze FAQs, supranote 147.
1s'
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6L-104 (West 2018).
142
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The Last Resort: The Federal Trade Commission

The Federal Trade Commission is tasked with protecting American
consumers by "preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business
practices, enhancing informed consumer choice and public understanding of the
competitive process. ... "2 With that goal in mind, the Commission has
become one of the leading regulatory bodies addressing data privacy and data
breaches.' 53 The Commission has taken multiple approaches toward addressing
data privacy, such as setting out aspirational guidelines for companies to create
security protocols that fit the needs of their business."' Additionally, the
Commission has initiated approximately sixty lawsuits against organizations that
suffered a breach and did not adequately protect consumer information."'
To bring enforcement actions against companies for data breaches, the
Commission relies upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914.156 In Section 5, Congress declared that all deceptive or unfair methods of
competition to be unlawful.' Recently the Commission has interpreted this
section as granting power for the Commission to monitor and regulate a
company's unfair or deceptive data security practices.5 5 Further, the
Commission is permitted to determine if a company's actions fall under the
unfair or deceptive prongs of Section 5 and take the action the Commission
determines to be appropriate. 59
i.

Enforcement Under Section Five's Deceptive Prong

First, the Commission can take action against organizations under the
deceptive prong of Section 5.160 To establish a violation of the deceptive prong,
152

About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (identifying the

agency's mission statement) (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
'53
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law ofPrivacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 604 (2014).
154

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
AND
POLICYMAKERS
(2012),
FOR
BUSINESSES

RECOMMENDATIONS

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
15s

FED.

TRADE

COMM'N,

PRIVACY

&

DATA

SECURITY

UPDATE:

2016

(2016),

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2016/privacyand datasecurity update_2016 web.pdf.
16
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
1s7
Id. § 45(a)(1).
158
See Peter S. Frechette, Note, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdictionover Information PrivacyIs
"Plausible,"but How FarCanIt Go?, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (2013).
19
See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
16
See Peter S. Frechette, supra note 158, at 1404.
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the Commission must show that the company's business practice "is likely to
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances." 161 A common
occurrence is that this type of action is instituted when an organization violates
its own terms of service, violates its privacy policy, or utilizes data in an
unauthorized manner.1 62
For example, in 2015, the Commission initiated an action against the
operators of the Ashley Madison dating website.'16 Prior to the complaint being
filed, the dating website suffered a significant data breach that affected
approximately thirty-six million consumers from 46 different countries.'" In the
complaint, the Commission claimed that the website's operators deceived their
consumers on a multitude of different fronts.' 6s Some of the alleged failures
included the lack of a written organizational information security policy and the
failure to implement access controls.1 66 Combined with those failures, the
website operators further held the website out, both implicitly and explicitly, as
being secure. 167 Additionally, the website further deceived consumers by listing
a "data security seal" on the website even though the service had never received
a "Trusted Security Award."' 6 8

161
FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the standard that the
Commission must meet to show deception).
162
Amanda R. Moncada, Note, When A Data Breach Comes a-Knockin', the FTC Comes aBlockin': Extending the FTC's Authority to Cover Data-Security Breaches, 64 DEPAUL L. REv.
911, 918 (2015); see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3-7,
FTC v.
Ruby Corp.,
No.
1:16-cv-02438
(D.D.C.
filed Dec.
14, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161214ashleymadisoncmpltl.pdf
(initiating
action against Ashley Madison because the company used user profiles in an unauthorized
manner).
163
See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3-7, FTC v. Ruby
Corp.,
No.
1:16-cv-02438
(D.D.C.
filed
Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161214ashleymadisoncmpltl.pdf.
164
See Daniel Victor, The Ashley Madison Data Dump, Explained, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/technology/the-ashley-madison-datadump-explained.html; see also Jonah Bromwich, Ashley Madison Users Face Threats ofBlackmail
and
Identity
Theft,
N.Y.
TIMEs,
(Aug.
27,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/technology/ashley-madison-users-face-threats-ofblackmail-and-identity-theft.html (explaining additional data security concerns resulting from the
Ashley Madison data breach).
165
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3-7, FTC v. Ruby Corp.,
No.
1:16-cv-02438
(D.D.C.
filed
Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161214ashleymadisoncmpltl.pdf.
166
Id. at 9.
167
Id. at 8.
168
Id. at 14.
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As a result of the dating website's actions, the Commission investigated
and took action against the owners for misrepresenting the website's security.169
To settle the lawsuit, the Commission and Ashley Madison entered into a consent
decree.170 Under the consent decree, Ashley Madison agreed to no longer
misrepresent the service's security features, to implement a data security
program designed to reasonably protect the users, and to perform biennial thirdparty security assessments."'7 Additionally, Ashley Madison agreed to pay
approximately ten million dollars in compensation to the Commission.1 72
ii.

Enforcement Under Section Five's UnfairProng

Next, under the unfair practices prong, the Commission has faced
pushback from organizations the Commission attempts to hold accountable
under Section 5 .7 The Commission most often utilizes the unfairness prong
when the Commission determines that an organization has failed to adequately
protect the consumers' personally identifiable information the organization has
collected.' 7 4 To prevail under this prong of Section 5, the Commission must show
that the unfair business practice "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition."' To
meet this burden, the Commission must show that the organization's practice
created significant monetary, safety, or health risks for consumers. 17 6 For
example, the Commission has utilized the unfair business practices prong to hold
two retailers responsible for transmitting consumers' payment information
without encryption.' 7 As a result of the retailers' failure, the consumers'
payment information was stolen and fraudulently used.17 The Commission took
action against both retailers for their failure to take reasonable security
169
Id. at 1; see also Mike McPhate, Ashley Madison Faces F.T.C. Inquiry Amid Rebranding,
N.Y. TIMEs (July 5, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/business/ashley-madison-ftcrebranding.html.
170
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 1, FTC v. Ruby
Corp.,
No.
1:16-cv-02438
(D.D.C.
Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161214ashleymadisonorderl.pdf.

171

Id. at 3-7.

Id. at 7.
Frechette, supra note 158, at 1405-06.
174
See Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach
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measures.'7 9 When the Commission is deciding whether to take action against a
company under this prong, it evaluates what was expected of the company, the
sensitivity of the compromised data, and the number of different records the
company has in its possession.so Practically, the Commission engages in a
sliding-scale-type analysis: "[t]he larger the volume of and the more sensitive the
consumer data that a company collects, the more detailed and sophisticated the
security measures should be . . . ."1" Multiple companies have attempted to
challenge the Commission's authority under this prong, but the two significant
challenges to the Commission's authority have faltered. 18 2
III. ANALYSIS
Currently there is no singular regulatory scheme or law that attempts to
regulate the wild wild west that is data security.' As discussed above, some
states have enacted consumer protection laws designed to protect consumers
after a breach occurred.' 84 Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission has taken
an active role in after-the-fact regulation for data breaches.' However, state and
Federal Trade Commission action fails to directly address and regulate the
existing weaknesses with data protection and identity authentication, even
though their action could potentially reduce the impact of the significant and
increasingly frequent data breaches that each and every organization
experiences.186
Section III.A. argues that Congress should act and address the
underlying weaknesses in the identity authentication scheme. This can be
effectuated by following the example of other nations that have achieved similar
milestones, such as Canada.1 7 This would be a significant shift from the current
methodology of how organizations verify a consumer's identity. However, the
shift would ultimately prove to be a worthwhile effort because consumer
protection would be increased and fraudulent activity as a result from data
breaches would ultimately be reduced. Next, Section III.B. will argue that
consumers are currently ill informed as to what degree their information is
collected by organizations and how the organizations utilize the information that

179
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Moncada, supra note 162 at 920-21.

181
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is collected. The proposed solution to this issue is that Congress, or even the
individual states, should enact legislation requiring organizations that collect
personally identifiable information to clearly identify the data that they collect
and explain how the data is utilized. Finally, Section IH.C. will argue that
Congress should directly empower the Federal Trade Commission to proactively
enforce data security standards before data breaches occur. One avenue this
could be accomplished through is the adoption of the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standards as a Federal Trade Commission regulation."ss
A.

The SocialSecurity Number is an Ineffective Means ofAuthenticatinga
Consumer's Identity and Must Be Reformed

From the beginning, the social security number was never meant to serve
the purpose that it currently serves: an end-all-be-all identification number.'
Over time, organizations recognized that each citizen possessed a number that
could serve as a unique individual identification and authentication method.190
While it was initially convenient for companies to collect this information, the
explosion in the collection of data has had unintended consequences and wideranging impacts.1 9' Further, the use of the social security number also has its own
inherent deficiencies.
First, the social security number can be an ineffective means of
identifying an individual because, for the first 75 years of issuing social security
numbers, the numbers were not randomized.' 92 Instead, the individual applying
for the social security card received their number based upon their geographic
location and year of birth.' 93 This hampered the system for a few different
reasons. First, the lack of randomization compromised the integrity of the social
security number.' 9 4 For example, armed with the correct information, an
individual could accurately guess someone else's social security number because

188
189

See supra Section II.A.
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the Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 11 (2003) (statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg,
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office).
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Id. at 8 (statement of Chairman Shaw).

191
See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 48, at 95-100 (2001) (discussing the implications of utilizing
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Soc.
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https://www.ssa.gov/employer/randomization.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
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of the sequential number progression."' This discovery and inherent defect
drastically compromises the security of the social security number.' 96 In
response, the Social Security Administration enacted a randomization process
that was put in place on June 25, 2011, to "protect the integrity" of the social
security number.1 97 Although the Social Security Administration did take proper
steps to remedy this defect, there remains a significant number of active social
security numbers that can be guessed with the proper information.1 9 8 Therefore,
the social security number alone is an ineffective means of identifying
individuals.
Next, your social security number is inherently difficult to have changed;
so much so that the Social Security Administration only issued 274 new social
security numbers in 2015.19 In order to have a social security number changed,
the applicant must meet one of five requirements set out by the Social Security
Administration.2" Further, simply because an individual may meet one of those
five requirements does not necessarily mean that the individual will be issued a
new number. 2 0 1 By no means is changing your social security number a clear
path to a fresh start either because many organizations may retain your old
number or link the new and old numbers within their internal records.2 02
Therefore, the fact that we are currently utilizing a virtually immutable number
that is frequently stolen as the key to many transactions is a major weakness of
the social security number.203
195
Social Security Numbers are Easy to Guess, AM. Ass'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SC.,
(July 6, 2009), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2009/07/social-security-numbers-are-easy-guess
(discussing a study conducted by Carnegie Mellon University researchers who were able to
accurately predict the Social Security numbers of individuals born after 1989).
'"
Id. (finding that "a computer-savvy attacker could simultaneously test numbers on credit
applications easily accessible online and harvest some 47 numbers per minute").
197
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(Mar.
3,
2016,
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200
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Turkel, supra note 199 (quoting a Social Security Administration spokesperson: "It is
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Third, the social security number is vastly overused by organizations that
may not and often do not adequately protect the information. 2 0 What began as a
method for citizens to obtain government benefits eventually morphed in to an
identification number to which each and every business wanted access.205
Among multiple motivations, businesses were motivated by the fact that they
could establish accounting systems without investing in the development of their
own identification numbers. 206 At the current time, this system has reached a
point where businesses may refuse to provide their service to a consumer who
does not provide their social security number.207 Some examples of organizations
that oddly require social security numbers include many public utility
companies, 208 college student identification, 209 and cell phone companies. 2 10
Additionally, the overuse of the social security number led some federal, state,
and local agencies to include social security numbers in public records.21 1
Given these weaknesses, among others, it is clear that the social security
number has grown to purposes beyond what it was designed for and needs to be
replaced or reimagined. A variety of different methods have been proposed to
replace the social security number, but there can be no one-size-fits-all
approach.2 12 One potential solution could be sourced from Canada, which has
recently addressed a similar issue with its social security number equivalent.2 13
In Canada, the government recognized the issues with having a singular national
identification number and enacted a sweeping privacy reform act. 2 14 A key
Jesse Emspak, Why Overusing Social Security Number Is Risky, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2011,
8:15 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43691269/ns/technologyand science-security/t/whyoverusing-social-security-number-risky/.
205
Id.
206
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204

207

Id
Utility
Services,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
(Aug.
2012),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0220-utility-services.
209
Farai Chideya, The Way We Use Social Security Numbers Is Absurd, FIvETHIRTYEIGHT
(Oct. 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-way-we-use-social-securitynumbers-is-absurd/.
210
Michael Huffington, Why Does AT&T Need My Social Security Number to Connect My
iPhone?, HUFFPOST (Nov. 17, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-huffington/whydoes-att-need-my-soci-b 64526.html.
211
Use and Misuse of Social Security Numbers, supra note 189, at 8 (statement of Chairman
Shaw) (discussing efforts to address the disclosure of social security numbers in public records,
but acknowledging that the disclosure will continue to be an issue for the time being).
212
Lily Hay Newman, Replacing Social Security Numbers Won't Be Easy, but It's Worth It,
WIRED (Oct. 13, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/social-security-numberreplacement.
213
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feature of this act involved removing a company's ability to require a social
insurance number before providing credit or other services.21 However, this
change has not exactly brought the results the Canadian government envisioned,
as identity theft has gradually increased since the law's passage.216
Therefore, a more apt solution appears to be enacting a national multifactor method for authentication.2 17 In fact, the current administration is
considering following this route, but it has not identified a likely multi-factor
authentication method.2 18 One promising solution can be modeled after Estonia's
system. In Estonia, each citizen is provided with a card that contains a unique
physical chip and code that, when combined with the citizen's PIN and
information on the organization's side, securely authenticates and authorizes the
transaction. 219 No matter how the social security card is replaced, the effort to
enact a bill authorizing the replacement will face significant pushback. Perhaps
the most ardent opponents will be major industry players, like banks and credit
reporting agencies. Their pushback will not be without merit because a new
system may require significant financial outlay as the system is adopted.
However, as the new system matures, banks and credit reporting agencies will
see their financial losses due to fraud drop significantly.
B. Privacy Policiesare Exceedingly Difficultfor the Average Consumer
to Decipherand Updates Must be Enactedfor Uniform Disclosure of
Information
With virtually every website one visits on the internet, the user is almost
guaranteed to encounter a privacy policy. Some websites have an applicable
privacy policy simply for website visitors, 2 20 and some websites have a separate
215

Id.
See Justina Deardoff & Katherine Huitmea, Identity Theft and FraudAre on the Rise in
Canada, CALGARY J. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.calgaryjournal.calindex.php/news/2633identity-theft-and-fraud-are-on-the-rise-in-canada.
217
Multi-factor authentication involves presenting two different pieces of evidence to verify
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Authentication (MPA), NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://www.nist.gov/itl/tig/backbasics-multi-factor-authentication (last updated Nov. 22, 2016).
218
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privacy policy for users with accounts. 221 Unknown to many consumers, these
policies often permit the companies to utilize the consumer's information in a
variety of ways because the company is the ultimate arbiter of the policy's
content.222 Therefore, it is imperative that the form of privacy policies are
standardized and consumers are properly educated about the information
companies are collecting and how that information is used. Without empowering
consumers with this information, the data breaches companies and websites
continue to experience will continue to present danger to unaware consumers.
Currently, the FTC takes the approach that companies should be freely
permitted to determine how to respond to privacy challenges. 22 3 This approach
has led to different companies sharing multiple common deficiencies with
privacy policies. For example, the average privacy policy requires a heightened
level of reading ability that a majority of consumers do not possess.22 4 By writing
a privacy policy in a complicated manner companies can achieve two potential
benefits. First, the complicated language and overall length can lead consumers
to either not read the policy or skim the policy, potentially missing important
details.22 5 Second, with a complicated policy, a company could encourage
consumers to disclose more information than is necessary.226 For example, some
companies include ambiguous terms in their policies that permit the unlimited
use of the information that is collected.227 Overall, the majority of consumers do
not take the appropriate time to familiarize themselves with a website's privacy
policy. 22 8 Without empowering consumers with easy to understand information
about privacy policies, companies will continue to stretch the bounds of
information that is collected, and the impact of data breaches will continue to be
significant.

or by other companies on our behalf."); Walmart Privacy Policy, WAL-MART,
https://corporate.walmart.com/privacy-security/walmart-privacy-policy (last updated Nov. 2017)
("We collect two types of information .... This also includes information you provide us through
technology, such as through a cookie placed on your computer when you visit our websites.").
221
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25, 2018).
222

See Allyson W. Haynes, Online PrivacyPolicies:ContractingAway Control OverPersonal

Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 587, 597 (2007).
223
Joel R. Reidenberg et al., DisagreeablePrivacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning
and Users' Understanding,30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 39, 43-44 (2015).
224
Id at 46.
225

See id. at 47.

226

Id. at 46.
PrivacyPolicy, BLUE APRON, https://www.blueapron.com/pages/privacy (last updated Mar.

227

1, 2017) (permitting the company to "[c]arry out any other purpose for which the information was
collected").
228

See Reidenberg et al., supra note 223, at 83.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

722

[Vol. 121

One potential solution follows a "nutrition label" approach. 22 9 This
approach has not yet been widely adopted, but it is designed to increase a
consumer's understanding of a privacy policy by encouraging a consumer to take
a quick glance for understanding.230 Congress or individual states should enact
specific legislation designed to require or strongly encourage companies to adopt
a form of this innovation. Furthermore, a legislative body has precedent for
taking this approach. For example, as recently as 1999, Congress enacted
heightened disclosure requirements for financial institutions through the GrammLeach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act"). 23 1 In pertinent part, the GLB Act permitted the
FTC to determine that financial institutions must inform their customers, with a
"clear and conspicuous" written notice, of the financial institution's privacy
policies.2 3 2 The institutions are required to disclose what information is collected,
how the financial institution uses the information, whether or not consumers can

limit the use, and if the financial institution shares the information with third
parties.233 Financial institutions responded to this requirement by developing the
common form information disclosure statements that the majority of financial
institutions currently utilize.2 34 Therefore, the adoption of the GLB Act serves as
an important guide for a legislative body to follow in reforming the use of privacy

policies.
By adopting a "clear and conspicuous" notice requirement for privacy
policies, Congress or a state legislature would be undertaking a significant
change and may face pushback from the business community. Therefore, it is
important that a deliberate approach is taken. For example, potential legislation
should first focus on requiring the most frequently websites to update their
privacy policies to be "clear and conspicuous." After several years, the remaining

websites will be responsible for updating their policies. By this point,
commercially available services will exist to assist the smaller websites in this
venture. Ideally, migration will occur over a three to five-year period.
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Ultimately, the benefit of better informing consumers vastly outweighs
the cost of requiring more from websites and businesses when it comes to
privacy. First and foremost, consumers will easily be able to understand what
types of personal information organizations keep about them. This will, in turn,
lead to consumers making informed decisions to either use or not use the website
or service. Once consumers know what information is being retained, they can
request that companies either not collect their information or remove their
information from the company's files. While this action will not directly lead to
a decrease in the number of data breaches, the impact of data breaches will be
reduced. The impact will be reduced because companies will be less likely to
retain significant amounts of personally identifiable information that are not
directly relevant to their businesses.
C. CongressShould Empower the Federal Trade Commission to Adopt
the Payment CardIndustry Data Security Standards as a Regulatory
Scheme to Ensure the Security of Consumer FinancialInformation
Currently, the FTC mainly focuses on conducting reactive investigation
and enforcement actions against companies that have suffered data breaches or
have caused losses to consumers.235 The FTC's enforcement ability is rooted in
an over one-hundred-year-old statute.23 6 Under this statute, the FTC is permitted
to investigate and take action against a company's unfair or deceptive data
security practices.237
However, this form of regulation is ineffective for a few reasons. First,
the FTC most often takes a reactive approach to data breaches.23 8 This reactive
approach means that a company with weak data security policies will go
unmonitored until the company experiences a significant data breach, which then
attracts the attention of the FTC. Thus, the potential impact of a company's weak
data security policy is amplified, and consumers' personally identifiable
information is placed at risk. Second, the ability of the FTC to investigate and
sanction companies after a data breach, under the unfair practices prong, is not
clear and has faced court challenges. 3 While the FTC has not lost a challenge
to its powers under the unfair practices prong, it is unclear if a company will
eventually succeed in a challenge.240 Therefore, the FTC requires clear authority
in this area.
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Presently, the most active form of regulation comes from the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standards. Under these standards, companies that
process transactions through the five major card payment networks must ensure
adequate security. 24 ' Through this primarily contractual relationship, companies
are subjected to announced audits by PCI as a requirement under the standards. 2 42
However, some companies merely view the audit as a hoop to jump through on
a yearly basis.243 While the standards aim to encourage compliance through fines
and private sanctions, now is the appropriate time for Congress to take action
and empower the FTC to proactively ensure the security of consumers'
information.
To take action, Congress should amend the Federal Trade Commission
Act to explicitly allow the Commission to take a proactive approach with
payment card information data security. Under this amendment, discretion
should be left to the Commission to enact necessary rules. The Commission
should then adopt the PCI-DSS framework as a base level regulatory framework,
with necessary improvements. For example, one improvement could strengthen
the process of verifying compliance with the standards and identify potential
alternative sanctions beyond fines. Overall, this proposal would face pushback
from industry for a variety of reasons. As with most increased regulation, the
industry would argue that companies' financial burdens from the investment in
new systems would be too great.
But the benefits to consumers outweigh the burdens placed on the
companies. For example, approximately $178 trillion is transmitted through noncash payments each year. 2 " Therefore, there is a real and significant financial
interest for both the government and companies to adopt a stringent set of
standards to secure consumers' financial information. By adopting the PCI-DSS
standards, companies would ultimately end up spending less money to cover
losses due to fraud. Furthermore, consumer confidence could increase, and the
economy could grow as a result of electronic payments being more secure. More
specifically, rather than being considered a one-and-done checklist, the
Commission would be able to ensure that the proper level of attention is given to
the regulations and that the impact for noncompliance is significant enough to
deter noncompliance. Overall, the benefits of these regulations would outweigh
the harms to the companies and would result in a more consumer-friendly
environment.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Every day, consumers are providing a significant amount of personally
identifiable information and financial information to companies. Each time a
consumer swipes his or her credit card, signs on to a website, or searches the
internet, a piece of information is generated about the consumer. While the
different pieces of information alone may not be impactful if disclosed, the total
volume of information generated each day makes all information a valuable
target for attackers. Attackers continually attempt to infiltrate computer systems
and are often successful. Therefore, it is imperative that steps are taken to curb
the risk of providing the personally identifiable information consumers are
required to provide in virtually every transaction. The best long-term solutions
for consumers, the government, and businesses would be to implement a national
multi-factor method for authentication instead of using social security numbers,
to require companies to provide users with clear privacy policies, and to allow
the Federal Trade Commission to be proactive with securing payment card
information data.
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